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Abstract 1 
Although humans qualify as one of the most cooperative animal species, the scale of 2 
violent intergroup conflict among them is unparalleled. Explanations of the underlying 3 
motivation to participate in an intergroup conflict, however, remain unsatisfactory. While 4 
previous research shows that intergroup conflict increases ‘in-group love’, it fails to identify 5 
robust triggers of ‘out-group hate’. Here, we present a controlled laboratory experiment, 6 
which demonstrates that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked systematically. We find direct and 7 
causal evidence that the intention to protect the in-group is not only a crucial motivator of 8 
‘out-group hate’ in defensive reactions, but also promotes preemptive offensive actions 9 
against out-group threat. Hence, the strength of ‘out-group hate’ depends on whether the own 10 
group is perceived to be on the offensive or the defensive side of the conflict. This finding 11 
improves our understanding of the escalation of intergroup conflicts and may have important 12 
implications for their prevention, as we find in our experiment that removing out-group threat 13 
substantially reduces intergroup aggression, leading to full peace. 14 
Keywords: intergroup conflict, parochial altruism, in-group love, out-group hate, defense 15 
16 
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What makes people go to war?  1 
Defensive intentions motivate retaliatory and preemptive intergroup aggression 2 
1. Introduction 3 
Intergroup conflict constitutes a complex social dilemma (Bornstein, 2003; Choi & 4 
Bowles, 2007). For the individual, participation in intergroup conflict is costly, as it may lead 5 
to injury or death, whereas victory benefits all in-group members, e.g., through territorial 6 
gains or the establishment of deterrence and safety. Therefore, strong individual incentives to 7 
free-ride on the other group members’ efforts exist (Bornstein, 2003). Eventually, however, 8 
extensive free-riding can cause a breakdown of cooperation within the group, leading to 9 
detrimental outcomes for all in-group members. To explain why we observe individually 10 
costly engagement in intergroup conflicts, it has been suggested that behavioral traits causing 11 
personally costly cooperation with in-group members (‘in-group love’) and aggressiveness 12 
toward out-groups (‘out-group hate’) might have co-evolved (Bernhard, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 13 
2006; Choi & Bowles, 2007). The empirical evidence gathered to test this co-evolutionary 14 
hypothesis is inconclusive, though (Rusch, 2014a). 15 
Although the presence of rivaling out-groups increases individuals’ engagement in 16 
various types of costly behaviors benefiting the in-group (e.g., Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 17 
1994; Bornstein, 1992; Burton-Chellew, Ross-Gillespie, & West, 2010; Puurtinen, Heap, & 18 
Mappes, in press), it is still unclear which factors trigger costly behavior to the detriment of 19 
out-groups (Fry & Söderberg, 2013). Astonishingly, unconditional ‘out-group hate’ has been 20 
rarely observed in previous research. Instead, in-group cooperation often coincides with the 21 
avoidance of intergroup competition (De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 22 
2008), even after the experimental induction of a “history of conflict” (Halevy, Weisel, & 23 
Bornstein, 2012), or in interaction between natural groups with a strong enmity (Weisel & 24 
Böhm, in press). In a similar vein, when measuring attitudes towards in-group and out-group 25 
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members, in-group positivity does not systematically correlate with out-group negativity (e.g., 1 
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Struch & Schwartz, 1989). Given the existence of frequent and 2 
brutal intergroup aggression in human history (Gat, 2009; Keeley, 1997; Kelly, 2005), 3 
however, there must be important motivations causing persistent and spiteful ‘out-group 4 
hate’. 5 
This study focuses on an important motivator for ‘out-group hate’ that has received 6 
little attention in previous research: the intention to protect the in-group from potential out-7 
group threat. Defense preparedness, e.g., conquering territories strategically in order to reach 8 
an advantageous position against possible attacks, and preemptive strikes against the potential 9 
aggressor, are important factors for explaining intergroup conflicts in hunter-gatherer 10 
societies (Gat, 2009) and wars on the country-level (Clausewitz, 1832; Levy, 2011). 11 
Why should individuals be more motivated to participate in defensive rather than 12 
offensive intergroup actions? Historical evidence (Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013; Rusch, 13 
2013) and evidence from animal studies (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; Kitchen & Beehner, 2007; 14 
Rusch, 2014a) suggest that the cost/benefit structure of intergroup conflict is different for 15 
attacks and defenses. Specifically, across species, the likelihood of aggressive attacks against 16 
out-groups decreases with perceived risk of failure (Kelly, 2005), and increases with 17 
prospects of individual benefits, including additional reproductive access for the victors 18 
(Glowacki & Wrangham, 2013; McDonald, Navarrete, & Van Vugt, 2012; Rusch, Leunissen, 19 
& van Vugt, in press). This militates against the typically supposed public good structure of 20 
intragroup cooperation (Rusch, 2013, 2014b). Costly involvement in group defense, on the 21 
other hand, increases with the individual importance of the resources at stake, including 22 
vulnerable relatives and reproductive access (Crofoot & Gilby, 2012; Rusch, 2014a), as well 23 
as with perceived fear of out-groups (De Dreu et al., 2010). Additionally, an unsuccessful 24 
defense may have negative consequences for any member of the group, e.g., loss of resources 25 
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or death, irrespective of whether the individual participated or not in the defensive action, 1 
increasing the perception of common fate among group members.  2 
In addition to the structural differences between offensive and defensive intergroup 3 
encounters that are likely to influence individual perception and behavior, research in social 4 
psychology indicates that the perception of an existential threat by being reminded about 5 
one’s own mortality increases in-group favoritism and out-group derogation (for reviews, see 6 
Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Jonas & Fritsche, 2013). Particularly an threat to the own 7 
social identity has been shown to fuel negative attitudes and emotions towards the threatening 8 
out-group (e.g., Brewer, 2007; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Such evaluations can culminate in 9 
“delegitimizing beliefs”, i.e., the attribution of extremely negative characteristics to another 10 
group, which, in turn, may justify intergroup aggression and violence (Bar-Tal, 2000). 11 
In line with this variety of evidence from various scientific disciplines, the motivations 12 
for participating in offensive and defensive intergroup aggression are likely to differ in their 13 
structure and strength. We suppose that the negligence of this important difference might 14 
explain the ambiguity of the existing experimental evidence, as in previous experiments it 15 
was unclear whether subjects would perceive themselves as being on the offensive or the 16 
defensive side of the intergroup conflict. We hypothesize that triggering defensive intentions 17 
in subjects will cause a greater readiness to engage in costly behavior to the detriment of the 18 
out-group than offensive intentions. We conducted an incentivized behavioral experiment to 19 
test our hypothesis by means of two different types of defensive intergroup actions: (1) 20 
retaliation of previously experienced ‘out-group hate’ in order to reduce the relative 21 
disadvantage compared to the other group (‘out-group hate’ ex post), and (2) preemptive 22 
strikes in order to reduce the likelihood of an absolute and relative disadvantage beforehand 23 
(‘out-group hate’ ex ante). 24 
 25 
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2. Materials and Methods 1 
Participants face modified versions of an established experimental game modeling 2 
intergroup conflict – the Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma-Maximizing Difference (IPD-MD) 3 
(De Dreu et al., 2010; Halevy et al., 2008, 2012). In the IPD-MD, participants are randomly 4 
assigned to one of two equal-sized groups. Each participant decides individually and 5 
independently how to divide valuable endowment-points between three options: (1) Each 6 
point KEPT in the personal account gives the individual a benefit of 1 point with no effect on 7 
any other player. (2) Each point contributed to the WITHIN pool of the in-group credits every 8 
in-group member with 0.5 points. Contribution to WITHIN has no negative consequences for 9 
out-group members, hence indicating peaceful ‘in-group love’ and a disregard or even a 10 
positive concern for the out-group’s payoff. (3) Lastly, each point contributed to the 11 
BETWEEN pool has the same positive consequences for the in-group as a point contributed 12 
to WITHIN, but additionally reduces the payoff of each out-group member by 0.5. Thus, 13 
contributing to BETWEEN again indicates ‘in-group love’ but now coupled with spiteful 14 
‘out-group hate’, that is, the concern to minimize the out-group’s absolute or relative payoff. 15 
We contrast the classic IPD-MD game with a group size of n = 3 and an endowment of 16 
e = 5 (see the Procedures section for details), in which all individuals in both groups decide 17 
simultaneously and can therefore not be sure whether their actions are defensive or offensive, 18 
(subsequently labeled SIM) with four other conditions utilizing a similar game structure, but 19 
with groups playing sequentially (labeled SEQ).  20 
Two of these conditions – SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE – are designed to investigate 21 
retaliatory ‘out-group hate’ ex post, that is, a response to an aggressive attack from another 22 
group. In the SEQ-HATE condition, members of one group – the second-movers – 23 
simultaneously allocate points contingent on the number of points allocated to BETWEEN by 24 
the opposing first-mover group, i.e., we use the so-called strategy vector method to elicit 25 
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second-movers’ complete contribution strategies (Selten, 1967; see the Procedures section for 1 
details). Hence, in SEQ-HATE, second-movers are able to retaliate against potential attacks by 2 
the first-movers and therefore avert a relative loss, which is common knowledge among both 3 
first- and second-movers. In the control condition SEQ-LOVE, second-movers distribute their 4 
points contingent on the first-movers’ contributions to WITHIN. Here, in the absence of any 5 
relative threat through the out-group, one may assume that second-movers’ cooperation 6 
(particularly ‘in-group love’) increases with a higher amount of contributions to WITHIN by 7 
the out-group, as a form of peaceful competition via in-group cooperation (Böhm & 8 
Rockenbach, 2013). 9 
Two additional conditions – SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE and SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE 10 
– aim to test whether the desire to defend the in-group can also cause an offensive display of 11 
‘out-group hate’ ex ante. Such defense-motivated attacks are historically well documented, 12 
e.g., the Israeli strike against Egyptian airfields in 1967. Moreover, there is recent evidence 13 
that aggression between individuals increases if it serves to protect one’s own self (Abbink & 14 
de Haan, 2014; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013), particularly when the interaction 15 
partner is an out-group member (De Dreu et al., 2010). In the SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE 16 
condition, first-movers can reduce the negative effect of second-movers’ ‘out-group hate’ on 17 
themselves. Each point contributed to the own BETWEEN pool preemptively reduces the 18 
negative effect of out-group members’ subsequent BETWEEN-contributions by 0.05 points 19 
until it may reach its minimum of 0 (from initially 0.5 points). For example, if the sum of 20 
first-movers’ contributions to BETWEEN is 5 points, each point potentially contributed to 21 
BETWEEN by the second-movers reduces first-movers’ payoff only by 0.5 – (5 × 0.05) = 22 
0.25 points. Hence, contributions of 10 or more points to BETWEEN by the first-movers 23 
completely remove the potential threat of losing points in this condition (because 0.5 – (10 × 24 
0.05) = 0), while still harming the second-movers with maximum severity (in the example 25 
case, each out-group member loses 10 × 0.5 = 5 points). Note, however, that keeping points 26 
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and free-riding on the protective contributions of the other in-group members is still payoff 1 
maximizing from the individual perspective because the intragroup public good dilemma 2 
remains unchanged. Should first-movers’ contribute to BETWEEN in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-3 
STRIKE, though, this could be explained by two motivations: either (1) the intention to 4 
preemptively defend against absolute and relative harm caused by the out-group, or (2) the 5 
desire to attack and harm the out-group without having to fear retaliation. To disentangle 6 
these two motivations, we conducted a control condition SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE in which we 7 
removed the second-movers’ BETWEEN pool. Here, second-movers can only choose 8 
between keeping points and contributing to WITHIN. Thus, first-movers do not have to fear 9 
second-movers ‘out-group hate’ and should thus only contribute to BETWEEN if they 10 
intended to harm the out-group without worrying about retaliation. 11 
2.1 Participants and Design 12 
In total, 216 students (131 male and 85 female) from various academic disciplines of a 13 
German university participated in the experiment (MDage = 24, Mage = 24.47, SD = 5.12). 14 
Treatment of participants was in agreements with the ethical guidelines of the German 15 
Research Foundation (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the German Psychological 16 
Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie). All participants gave their written informed 17 
consent to participate voluntarily and were assured that all statistical analyses and reports 18 
would be anonymous. Decisions were incentivized. To avoid potential losses, participants 19 
received an additional flat-fee of €4. On average, participants earned €7.40 in the 45-minute 20 
experiment. 21 
The sessions of 24 participants each were randomly assigned to one of five 22 
experimental between-subjects conditions: SIM, SEQ-HATE, SEQ-LOVE, SEQ-23 
PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE, and SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE. Because the sequential (SEQ) 24 
conditions assign two roles randomly to participants (first-mover and second-mover), there 25 
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was one session assigned to SIM and there were two sessions assigned to each of the other 1 
conditions in order to have 24 independent observations in each condition. One session was 2 
filled with a research assistant, because one subject did not show up; the data of the assistant 3 
were excluded from all analyses. 4 
2.2 Procedures 5 
Participants pre-registered for experimental sessions online (Greiner, 2004). On arrival, 6 
each person was randomly allocated to a cubicle. All the interactions and corresponding 7 
decisions in the experiment were computer-mediated using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 8 
2007). Participants were given written instructions (see electronic supplementary material). 9 
The experimenter read the instructions aloud. It was explained that each participant is 10 
randomly assigned to a group of size n = 3 that is matched with another three-person group 11 
(labeled the blue and the green group). In all conditions except SIM, each group was 12 
randomly given either the role of the first-movers or the second-movers. Each participant was 13 
endowed with e = 5 points (1 point = €0.50) and had to decide how to allocate these points 14 
among three behavioral options (except in the SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE/second-mover 15 
condition, where subjects only had two options). Allocations affected the personal outcome, 16 
as well as the in-group and the out-group members’ outcomes. In order to have an equal 17 
amount of behavioral observations for each potential response pattern of second-movers 18 
without deceiving participants, we used the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967). 19 
Accordingly, second-movers indicated their responding contribution for each amount 20 
potentially contributed to WITHIN (SEQ-LOVE) or BETWEEN (SEQ-HATE and SEQ-21 
PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE), respectively, by the first-movers. This yields n × e + 1 = 3 × 5 + 1 = 22 
16 responses in SEQ-HATE (0 to 15 points) and 11 responses in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRKE 23 
(0 to 10 or more points), but only the stated response to the actual behavior of first-movers 24 
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was eventually payoff-relevant.1 Neutral labels were used in the instructions, e.g., ‘decision 1 
making task’, ‘project A’ (WITHIN pool), and ‘project B’ (BETWEEN pool), and there was 2 
no use of potentially emotion-laden words like ‘cooperation’, ‘competition’, ‘aggression’ etc. 3 
Participants could ask clarifying questions before the experiment started. To make sure that 4 
they had understood the game structure properly, participants had to correctly answer some 5 
test questions before making their allocation decision anonymously. Afterwards, participants 6 
answered a post-experimental questionnaire, including demographics. At the end, each 7 
participant received individual payoff information, and was paid in private. 8 
3. Results 9 
The dataset containing individual-level behavioral observations used for the following 10 
analyses can be found in the electronic supplementary material. 11 
3.1 Retaliatory ‘Out-Group Hate’ 12 
Figure 1 displays the contributions in SIM, as well as first-movers’ contributions in 13 
SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE. On average, first-movers overall contributions, i.e., all points not 14 
KEPT, in SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE are similar to the overall contributions of players in 15 
SIM, SIM: M = 2.63, SD = 2.34, SEQ-HATE: M = 2.92, SD = 2.19, SEQ-LOVE: M = 2.61, SD 16 
= 1.56; one-way ANOVA: F(2, 68) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 = .005. In line with previous research, 17 
participants in SIM show little ‘out-group hate’, contributing less than 10 % of points to 18 
BETWEEN. Importantly, ‘out-group hate’ does not significantly differ between first-movers 19 
in the two sequential conditions and players in the simultaneous condition, SIM: M = 0.42, SD 20 
= 1.18, SEQ-HATE: M = 0.50, SD = 1.29, SEQ-LOVE: M = 0.65, SD = 0.94; one-way 21 
ANOVA: F(2, 68) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 = .007. Overall, first-movers’ contribution patterns look 22 
very similar across conditions. 23 
                                                
1 The strategy space in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE was limited from 0 to “10 or more” points because 
the strategic consequences of own contributions were the same if at least 10 points were contributed to 
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Figure 2 displays allocations of points KEPT (panel A), contributed to WITHIN (panel 1 
B), or contributed to BETWEEN (panel C) of second-movers in SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE. 2 
Similarly to first-movers, overall contributions of second-movers do not significantly differ 3 
between SEQ-HATE and SEQ-LOVE (SEQ-HATE: M = 3.14, SD = 0.36, SEQ-LOVE: M = 4 
2.63, SD = 0.36; repeated-measures ANOVA: F(1, 46) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 = .021). Moreover, 5 
the effect of first-movers’ contributions to BETWEEN (SEQ-HATE) or WITHIN (SEQ-6 
LOVE) has no impact on overall contributions of second-movers, F(15, 690) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 7 
= .021. There is a weak interaction effect of first-movers’ contributions and condition on 8 
second-movers overall contributions, F(15, 690) = 1.577, p = .074, ηp2 = .033. Simple slopes 9 
indicate that aggregated contributions to WITHIN and BETWEEN increase as a function of 10 
first-movers’ contributions to WITHIN (SEQ-LOVE), F(15, 345) = 1.841, p = .028, ηp2 = 11 
.074, but not as a function of first-movers’ contributions to BETWEEN (SEQ-HATE), F(15, 12 
345) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 = .024 (see Figure 2, panel A: white bars but not grey bars are 13 
decreasing).2 14 
More importantly, supporting our hypothesis, we indeed find a significant interaction 15 
effect of first-movers’ contributions and condition on second movers’ ‘out-group hate’, 16 
repeated-measures ANOVA: F(15, 690) = 6.602, p < .001, ηp2 = .126. While there is a 17 
significant increase of second-movers’ ‘out-group hate’ in SEQ-HATE, F(15, 345) = 8.817, p 18 
< .001, ηp2 = .277, we observe no such effect in SEQ-LOVE, F(15, 345) < 1, p > .250, ηp2 = 19 
.027 (see Figure 2, panel C: grey bars but not white bars are increasing). This result indicates 20 
that the second-movers retaliate against the first-movers’ (potential) aggression by increasing 21 
their ‘out-group hate’. In fact, at a certain point aggressive contributions to BETWEEN by 22 
second-movers even exceed their peaceful contributions to WITHIN, increasing up to almost 23 
the quadruple compared to the SIM condition. 24 
                                                
2 The increasing overall contributions in SEQ-LOVE are particularly driven by an increase of peaceful 
contributions to WITHIN, F(15, 345) = 2.428, p < .001, ηp2 = .126. 
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3.2 Preemptive ‘Out-Group Hate’ 1 
Although the results presented so far strongly support the hypothesis that spiteful ‘out-2 
group hate’ increases as a response to the opponents’ harmful acts, they do not answer the 3 
question as to how conflicts start in the first place. We hypothesize that the desire to defend 4 
the in-group is not only important for the participation in vindictive intergroup actions but 5 
might also play a crucial role in motivating attacks in the form of preemptive strikes.  6 
Figure 1 displays the contributions of first-movers in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE and 7 
SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE. A comparison of the overall contributions in SIM, SEQ-8 
PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE and SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE reveals a significant difference between 9 
conditions, one-way ANOVA: F(2, 69) = 5.005, p = .009, ηp2 = .127. We observe the highest 10 
overall contributions in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE (M = 3.08, SD = 1.89), moderate 11 
contributions in SIM (M = 2.63, SD = 2.34), and the lowest in SEQ-SECURE-STRIKE (M = 12 
1.42, SD = 1.28). The distribution of points to WITHIN and BETWEEN is particularly 13 
important for the focus of the present paper. Supporting our hypothesis, we find that ‘out-14 
group hate’ significantly differs between these conditions (one-way ANOVA: F(2, 69) = 15 
11.691, p < .001, ηp2 = .253. As Figure 1 shows, ‘out-group hate’ is more than four times 16 
larger in SEQ-PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE (M = 1.75, SD = 1.82) than in SIM (M = 0.42, SD = 17 
1.18), Bonferroni: p = .001. In contrast, ‘out-group hate’ is virtually not present in SEQ-18 
SECURE-STRIKE (M = 0.08, SD = 0.28) – in fact, there are only 2 out of 24 subjects who 19 
each contribute just one point to BETWEEN – which does significantly differ from SEQ-20 
PREEMPTIVE-STRIKE (Bonferroni: p < .001). This strongly supports our conjecture that the 21 
intention to protect the in-group may indeed cause offensive actions against out-groups and 22 
leads to considerable ‘out-group hate’. 23 
4. Discussion 24 
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We have argued that the intention to protect the own group may be an important 1 
motivator of ‘out-group hate’ in intergroup conflicts. Our results clearly show that having the 2 
option of retaliation in order to decrease relative losses of the own group causes individually 3 
costly, off-equilibrium strategy choice, i.e., ‘out-group hate’. Furthermore, the findings 4 
indicate that preemptive ‘out-group hate’ is displayed only when it serves to prevent 5 
(potential) future aggression against the in-group, i.e., groups use defense-motivated first-6 
strikes to avoid absolute and relative losses. Besides these main findings, the experiment 7 
provides further support for the ‘intergroup comparison – intragroup cooperation hypothesis’ 8 
(Böhm & Rockenbach, 2013; see also Burton-Chellew & West, 2012) by showing that 9 
intragroup cooperation increases as a function of the out-group’s peaceful cooperation, i.e., 10 
first-movers’ WITHIN-contributions in the condition SEQ-LOVE. 11 
Our findings provide direct and causal evidence that ‘out-group hate’ can be provoked 12 
by manipulating the extent to which conflict parties perceive themselves to be in a vulnerable 13 
position. However, ‘out-group hate’ still is collectively destructive and likely to cause 14 
retaliation since the complete elimination of competition is often unlikely. Thus, a cascade of 15 
strikes and counter-strikes may eventually lead to mutual losses and conflict perpetuation 16 
(Halevy et al., 2012; Leibbrandt & Sääksvuori, 2012). 17 
Our results and experimental manipulations are likely to stimulate further research on 18 
intergroup conflict and aggression in different directions. For instance, accessing retaliatory 19 
‘out-group hate’ through responses to expected harmful actions by the out-group using the 20 
strategy vector method may be considered as a rather “cold” and deliberate response. We 21 
decided to use the strategy vector method in order to avoid deception of participants. 22 
However, future research may investigate whether automatic responses due to “hot” 23 
emotional states like anger, which have been shown to elicit in-group biased behaviors toward 24 
out-groups (e.g., Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), further increase ‘out-group hate’. 25 
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Moreover, although our experiment provides first behavioral evidence that realistic threat 1 
induces ‘out-group hate’, in real-word intergroup relations threats are often rather symbolic 2 
(e.g., due differences between group morals, standards, beliefs, and attitudes; see Stephan & 3 
Stephan, 2000). Therefore, it is an interesting question for future research whether the 4 
manipulation of perceived symbolic threats also increases ‘out-group hate’ in a behavioral 5 
setting. 6 
The present results have important implications for peace research and research on 7 
group aggression more generally: Once the threat of aggression against the in-group – either 8 
currently or in the future – is credibly removed, individuals show virtually no ‘out-group hate’ 9 
in our experiment, substantially reducing the risk of violent intergroup conflict. Furthermore, 10 
being able to observe (or expect) out-groups’ peaceful and unthreatening cooperation may 11 
spark increased peaceful cooperation by the observing group as well. 12 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Mean points KEPT, contributed to the WITHIN pool, and contributed to the 
BETWEEN pool by experimental condition. Each experimental condition with N = 24 
participants. Error bars represent 95 % confidence intervals. 
 
Figure 2. Second-movers’ mean points (A) KEPT, (B) contributed to the WITHIN pool, and 
(C) contributed to the BETWEEN pool by the expected aggregated contribution to the 
BETWEEN pool (SEQ-HATE condition) or the WITHIN pool (SEQ-LOVE condition) of 
first-movers. Each experimental condition with N = 24 participants. Error bars represent 95 % 
confidence intervals. 
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